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INTRODUCTION
Among the newly independent island States with heterogeneous
populations that emerged following decolonization, Fiji was widely
regarded as a model of multi-racial democracy. Fiji gained inde-
pendence in 1970 from British colonial rule, and progressed rapidly
into the world of modern politics with a constitution and govern-
ment patterned after the British system. This system was suddenly
eroded by two successive coups on May 14 and September 26,
1987.1 The coup's leader, Colonel Rabuka, removed the democrati-
cally elected government of Bavadra, abrogated the 1970 Constitu-
tion, declared himself head of state, proclaimed Fiji a republic, and
announced the formation of a new Council of Ministers.' These ac-
tions generated both regional and international repercussions. Most
of the South Pacific States condemned the coups and the overthrow
of the constitutional government of Fiji.3 The Commonwealth
Heads of Government, meeting in Canada on October 18, 1987,
expelled Fiji from the Commonwealth.'
Confronted with mounting economic downturn and political im-
passe, Rabuka named Ratu Sir Penaia the first President of the
Republic, and stepped down as the head of state on December 6,
1987.6 The new President appointed Ratu Sir Kamisese as Prime
* Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea.
I. On May 14, 1987, Colonel Rabuka, the coup leader, stormed Parliament, took the
newly-elected government hostage and suspended the constitution. While political peace ne-
gotiations with the Governor-General were in progress, and racial riots escalated, Rabuka
launched his second coup on September 26, 1987, annulled the constitution and assumed full
control of the government.
2. See Post Courier, Papua New Guinea, Oct. 1, 1987, at 8; id. Oct. 2, 1987, at 1; see
also Pac. Islands Monthly, Nov. 1987, at 10-15.
3. See Pac. Islands Monthly, Nov. 1987, at 13; Post Courier, Papua New Guinea, Oct.
2, 1987, at 8; Bell, The Unquiet Pacific, in CONFLICT STUDIEs 205, at 4-6 (published by The
Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, London,
England).
4. See Pac. Islands Monthly, Nov. 1987, at 12.
5. See Post Courier, Papua New Guinea, Dec. 7, 1987, at 7. Ratu Sir Penaia resigned
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Minister of a civilian cabinet.6 This post-revolutionary regime is re-
quired to enact a new constitution for the Republic of Fiji ensuring
that the indigenous Fijians will always be in control of the govern-
ment.' The indigenous control requirement violates basic principles
of international law, and the international legal implications of
such a condition are serious.
Compliance with the requirement that indigenous Fijians control
the government would be discriminatory and would substantially
prejudice the ambient population. A "gradation" among the citi-
zens of the State would be created, resulting in unequal rights and
duties. The introduction of a caste-like racial system would have a
disastrous impact on the multiracial equilibrium of Fiji. The overall
situation cannot be permitted under international law, which for-
bids racial discrimination and promotes human rights for all. As a
party to the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination,8 Fiji has a greater obligation
to reflect nonracial policies in its future constitution. This article
will analyze Fiji's international duty to oppose racism, and how a
constitutional guarantee of an indigenous government would under-
mine this duty.
Under the proposed arrangement, all non-native racial groups
will be permanently deprived of their equal rights to participate in
governing their country-a basic human right recognized in, and
protected by, international law. The greatest danger of this depriva-
tion is that subnationalism and group consciousness may develop
among the aggrieved races. The political unity and territorial integ-
rity of Fiji is likely to be threatened. The persistent denial of inter-
as the Governor-General of Fiji after the proclamation of the Republic.
6. Kamisese lost his position as the Prime Minister in the April 1987 election. Pac.
Islands Monthly, May 1987, at 10. Of the 21 cabinet ministers, ten took part in the military
government of Rabuka and four are army colonels (including Rabuka). Pac. Islands
Monthly, Jan. 1988, at 12.
7. Rabuka claims that his military actions are intended to ensure the birthright of the
native Fijians. He reasons that prior to British rule, the territory was administered by tradi-
tional chiefs, but "at independence the sovereignty of the country was never returned to the
chiefs [and] now they want it back." His proposed brand of democracy prescribes that elec-
tions must be held purely on a communal basis and that the majority seats in Parliament
must be reserved for natives so that they can always form their own government "in the land
that belongs to them," See Post Courier, Papua New Guinea, Oct. 1, 1987, at 8; id. Oct. 2,
1987, at 8. One of the reports of the Constitutional Review Committee also echoed the same
submission. It was suggested that in the Chamber Parliament of 70 seats, 40 seats should be
reserved for the natives. See Pac. Islands Monthly, June 1987, at 16.
8. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 350, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 650 [hereinafter Convention on Racial
Discrimination].
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nal self-determination in the form of equal rights may persuade the
aggrieved races to seek territorial secession as a way to restore their
rights and interests. Should such an event occur, it will be detri-
mental to the regional order and beyond. It is therefore in the best
interest of Fiji to explore other viable, nondiscriminatory means for
the protection of indigenous rights which will concomitantly foster
multiracial integration.
I. THE GROUNDS FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN
DOMESTIC RACISM
Modern States seldom consist of a single racial group. The no-
tion of a modern State "presupposes the existence of socioeco-
nomic-political structures capable of allowing the co-existing pur-
suit of whatever ideological differences are combined under that
umbrella." 9 There are numerous politically stable States that con-
tain more than one distinctly identifiable racial group. The forma-
tion of new States composed of only one racial group is neither
possible nor desirable in view of the existing complexion and facts
of international life. It is possible to produce an endless list of dis-
tinct ethnic groups in various regions of the world, who have almost
no chance of viability as independent entities. This is why the U.N.
Charter contemplates a plural society composed of various racial,
linguistic and religious groups sharing a larger common identity
with their state. 10 It advocates racial integration and a multi-racial
existence.
A. General International Directive
The secular, multiracial, multicultural and multilingual connota-
tion of Statehood promoted by the U.N. Charter leads the U.N. to
denounce all forms and manifestations of racism. This prohibition
has been thoroughly internationalized by the U.N. through a con-
stant flow of authoritative resolutions, declarations and conven-
tions." The U.N. Charter is premised upon the dignity, equality
and worth inherent in all human beings. Member States have
pledged themselves to take joint and separate action, in cooperation
with the U.N., to promote universal respect for human rights for
9. Bassiouni, Self-Determination and the Palestinians, 65 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC.
32 (1971).
10. See generally, U.N. CHARTER.
11. See, e.g., infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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all, without distinction as to race or other attributes.' The building
of a world society, free from all forms of racial segregation and
discrimination, is one of the preconditions for the enjoyment of
human rights. This basic concern, shared by all communities, has
prompted the U.N. to outlaw racism wherever it exists and in
whatever guise. This attitude is demonstrated in several documents.
1. The 1960 Decolonization Declaration: This document pro-
claims the urgency of an unconditional end to all practices of racial
segregation and discrimination."3
2. The 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination:" This document also affirms the necessity
of speedily eliminating racial discrimination throughout the world.
It reasons that racial discrimination harms not only those who are
subjected to it but also those who practice it. The Declaration calls
on all States to take effective measures to revise governmental and
public policies which have the effect of creating racial discrimina-
tion, and to rescind any discriminatory laws and regulations. It also
prescribes that States pass legislation expressly forbidding racial
discrimination and combat those prejudices which lead to racism.' 5
In particular, this declaration provides that no discrimination by
reason of race, color, or ethnic origin shall interfere with the enjoy-
ment of political rights by any person. This proscription includes
the right to take part in the government of the country, directly or
indirectly. 6
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: The institution of racism received its great-
est blow from this landmark agreement, unanimously adopted by
the U.N. in 1965.17 The preamble reflects the sentiment and atti-
tude of the U.N. members towards racism and the concerns which
led to the agreement. The Convention perceives racism as an inher-
ent evil and a major obstacle to the protection and promotion of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. Racism prevents
the sociocultural development of all peoples in a State, and it stulti-
fies international economic cooperation.
12. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c) and 56.
13. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514(xv), at preamble para. 9 (1960) [hereinafter Decolonization Declaration].
14. G.A. Res. 1904 (xviii), Nov. 10, 1963, reprinted in 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 1081-84
(1964).
15. Id. at arts. 4 & 5.
16. Id. at art. 6.
17. G.A. Res. 2106 (xx), Dec. 21, 1965; see also Convention on Racial Discrimination,
supra note 8.
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Racism is also regarded as a potential threat to world peace and
security. The world community is convinced that any superiority
based on racial differentiation is "scientifically false, morally con-
demnable, socially unjust and dangerous," and that there is no
"justification for racial discrimination in theory or in practice any-
where."18 The total illegitimacy of racism is taken for granted. In
essence, the Convention calls for an immediate elimination of all
racial discrimination. The Convention unequivocally guarantees the
equal political rights of all citizens of a State, in particular the
right to participate in the government of the country. 19 The Con-
vention imposes definite obligations upon State parties to adopt the
necessary measures for the speedy elimination of all existing forms
of racial discrimination within their territories, and the prevention
of future racist legislation and practices.2 0 States also have an af-
firmative duty to promote understanding between races in their ju-
risdiction, and to assist in building an international community free
from all racial segregation and discrimination."
The most elementary concern of the international community is
to establish minimum conditions for dignified human existence.
This concern is incorporated in the Convention. The absolute prohi-
bition of racial discrimination is no longer indefinite and elastic but
has become a part of solemn international obligations.22 The prac-
tice of racial discrimination infringes upon human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all, and is decried by the U.N. 3
B. Specific Implementation of Anti-Racial Policies
To achieve the U.N. Charter objective of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all in a multiracial State, all forms of ra-
cism must be abolished. The U.N. has reiterated this precondition
on many occasions, particularly in resolutions condemning the for-
18. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 8, at preamble para. 6, 5 I.L.M.
at 352, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. at 651.
19. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 8, at art. 5c.
20. See id. at arts. 2-7.
21. See id.
22. For an account of the Convention and its legal effects see N. LERNER, THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (M. Nijhoff
2d ed. 1980).
23. For an evaluation of the Convention, see Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Dis-
crimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, I DEN. J. INT'L L. POL. 29 (1971). Nagendra Singh, President of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, observes: "Basic to human rights is the concept of non-discrimina-
tion." N. SINGH, ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PEACE & WAR AND THE FUTURE OF
HUMANITY I (M. Nijhoff ed. 1986).
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mer white racial minority regime of Rhodesia, and the current
white Afrikaaner racist regime of South Africa.
1. Rhodesia: The U.N. castigated the revolutionary Smith re-
gime of Rhodesia in 1965 as illegal, and succeeded in campaigning
for the universal non-recognition of Rhodesia.2" There is nothing in
international law or in the U.N. Charter which forbids revolution
within a State.2 5 There is also no rule of international law which
proscribes the emergence of a revolutionary regime in a State. In-
ternational law generally does not deal with the legality and consti-
tutionality of domestic activities. 6 Consequently, some scholars
doubt whether the U.N. stand on Rhodesia reflects the interna-
tional legal position, or rather, by declaring the regime illegal, the
U.N. exercised certain juridical powers which are absent in the
Charter.2 7 Admittedly, the Rhodesian situation and the regime
arising therefrom could be illegal under constitutional law. But it is
difficult to maintain that the revolution was illegal under interna-
tional law. From where did the U.N. derive its authority to declare
the Rhodesian situation illegal?
A close examination of the U.N. posture on the Rhodesian situa-
tion reveals that it was declared illegal not because the revolution
was forbidden under international law, but because the circum-
stances surrounding the revolution and various acts of the revolu-
tionary regime were unlawful under international law. The revolu-
tion was perpetrated by a racial minority to deprive the equal rights
and self-determination of the majority peoples of Rhodesia. Imme-
diately following the seizure of power, the regime promulgated va-
rious repressive and discriminatory domestic laws. Its constitution
established a constant white minority racial rule in Rhodesia. The
bulk of the population was denied its right to take part in the legis-
lature and government. The regime was "based upon a systematic
denial in its territory of certain civil and political rights, including
in particular the right of every citizen to participate in the govern-
ment of his country, directly or through representatives elected by
24. For various U.N. resolutions on Rhodesia, see 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 912-26 (1966);
Cefkin, The Rhodesian Question at the U.N., 22 INT'L ORG. 649 (1968); Okolie, Southern
Rhodesia in International Law After the UDI, 1 GLENDALE L. REv. 307 (1976).
25. Higgins, International Law, Rhodesia and the UN, 23 WORLD TODAY 94-96
(1967).
26. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 69 (4th ed.
1960); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (2d ed. 1970); Tinoco Claims (U.K. v.
Costa Rica), I U.N. Rep. 381 (1923).
27. Halderman, Some Legal Aspects of Sanctions in the Rhodesian Case, 17 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 700-01 (1968).
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regular, equal and secret suffrage."2 The regime thereby effec-
tively installed racist policies and removed human rights.
The policies of the Smith regime repudiated numerous basic
norms of international law and engendered international repercus-
sions. The regime created a justification for unilateral humanitarian
intervention by individual States. The situation in Rhodesia in-
volved elements of aggression in the most comprehensive sense. 9
Potential and actual threats to peace and security of the State esca-
lated.8 0 Therefore, the situation was well within U.N. jurisdiction.
Under various international instruments such as the U.N. Char-
ter,31  the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2  the
Decolonization Declaration, 3 and the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of Racism and the Covenants on Human Rights, 4 the U.N.
succeeded in preparing a strong case against the Smith regime and
in making the overall situation a legitimate concern for the world
community.
The constitution, internal laws and administrative policies of
Rhodesia were judged by the U.N. to be against specific interna-
tional obligations undertaken by Rhodesia. The proposed constitu-
tion of Fiji, once enacted, will also effectively establish racial dis-
crimination among the Fijians, and remove the equal rights of all
citizens in defiance of concrete provisions of Fiji's international ob-
ligations. Under the proposed constitution, Fiji is likely to militate
against one of the basic purposes of the U.N.-the protection and
promotion of human rights and justice in providing equal rights for
all human beings. This dimension of the constitution is comparable
to the Rhodesian situation. The proposed Constitution of Fiji will
not survive if measured in terms of the documents that the U.N.
invoked in assessing the lawfulness of the Rhodesian constitution.
The proposed racist features of the Fiji constitution repudiate vari-
ous international documents proscribing racism, which will be re-
lied on by the U.N. to justify any action intended to generate pres-
28. Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 112
(1965).
29. McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the U.N.: The Lawfulness of International
Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 10-11 (1968).
30. Fenwick, When Is There A Threat to the Peace?-Rhodesia, 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
754 (1967); Gupta, The Rhodesian Crisis and the OAU, 9 INT'L STUD. 55 (1967).
31. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
32. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, 43 AM. J. INT'L L.
127 (Supp. 1949).
33. See supra note 13.
34. See supra note 8.
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sure on Fiji to fulfill its international obligations.
2. South Africa: The U.N. also finds the apartheid policy of the
white Afrikaaner regime of South Africa to be a species of racial
discrimination. The majority black peoples are not represented in
the legislature or the executive branches of government. Political
positions in these organs of the government are restricted to the
white race.85 This policy deprives the majority black peoples of
their equal civil and political rights, including their right to partici-
pate in the government of their country.
The Bantustan scheme of the regime, which follows a policy of
racial segregation against an identified black majority, is vehe-
mently condemned.86 Since 1952, the U.N. has conducted a strong
campaign demanding the realization of equal rights in South Af-
rica."7 The actions and policies of the regime are stamped as forms
of racial discrimination and, as such, have received the full brunt of
antiapartheid attack.
C. The Grounds for U.N. Intervention
The basic duty of the U.N. is to attain its purposes.3 8 Among the
U.N. Charter provisions, Articles 55 and 56 cover nearly every as-
pect of human life and matters pertaining to the internal order of a
State. These are not mere statements of distant aims but involve
precise legal obligations. Article 55 requires the member States to
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all. Article 56 requires individual mem-
ber States to take joint and separate action for the achievement of
the purposes enumerated in Article 55.
35. See Electoral Consolidation Act 46, 1946, §§ 1 and 3(1); Republic of South Africa
Constitution Act 32, 1961, §§ 34(d), 46(c), 68(2).
36. Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African Ban-
tustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978). Under the Bantustan scheme, the
indigenous black population of South Africa is confined exclusively to their place of birth.
They are not allowed to relocate to other areas of the country, particularly the white regions.
Thus, the Bantustan system denies freedom of movement within South Africa to the black
community. See also notes and documents of Dept. of Pol. and Sec. Council Affairs, U.N.
Centre Against Apartheid.
37. For various resolutions on South Africa, see H.S. CRuz. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
148-95, 202-13 (1971). For information on the denial of equal rights in South Africa, see
U.O. UMOZURIKE, SELF DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (1972); SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE RULE OF LAW (1960); C.G. WEERAMANTRY, APARTHEID-THE CLOSING PHASES?
(1980).
38. To attain its purposes, the U.N. makes use of several provisions in the U.N. Char-
ter. For example, the General Assembly is authorized to discuss and recommend any mea-
sures under Arts. 10, 13(l.b) and 14. The Security Council can adopt various measures
under Chapter VII of the Charter.
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Article 56 uses the word "pledge" to create a legally binding ob-
ligation. 9 When member States pledge themselves to promote the
U.N. purposes in Article 56, they assume obligations to promote
respect for human rights.40 Implicit in this legally binding obliga-
tion of protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental
freedoms is the inevitable precondition of the elimination of racial
discrimination. Member States therefore have a specific obligation
to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination in their territories.
The practice of racial discrimination transgresses human rights.
This, in effect, frustrates one of the U.N.'s purposes. Hence the
U.N.'s authority to deal with racial discrimination springs from the
breach of definite obligations under the U.N. Charter provisions.41
II. THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AND THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST RACISM
The assurance that the governmental power of Fiji must always
be held by the indigenous Fijians would amount to constitutional
recognition of the political supremacy of a particular race in a mul-
tiracial State. This would permanently deprive the remaining racial
groups of their equal political rights. The right of every citizen to
take part in the government of his country is a fundamental human
right conferred without distinction as to race, color or ethnicity. 2
The concentration of governmental power in a particular race car-
ries with it the danger of establishing a race-oriented administra-
39. A full discussion on this point may be found in Wright, Recognition and Self-
Determination, 48 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 30 (1954); Nayer, Self-Determination Beyond
the Colonial Context: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEx. INT'L L. J. 334 (1975); Schweib, The
I.C.J and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 348-49 (1962);
Petrenko, The Human Rights Provisions of the U.N. Charter, 9 MANITOBA L.J. 57 (1978);
Newman, Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 5 HUM. RTS. J. 283
(1972).
40. The report of the San Francisco Committee 11/3 shares the view that "pledge" is
in no way without legal force. The Committee was concerned with economic and social coop-
eration. Its views on Art. 56 are explained in M.S. RAJAN, U.N. AND DOMESTIC JURISDIC-
TION 277 (1961).
41. See also U.N. CHARTER Art. 104. Article 104 of the Charter authorizes the U.N.
to act in the territories of its members in any legal capacity necessary to fulfill its purposes.
For arguments supporting the U.N. competence to deal with human rights violation cases,
see Schweib, An Instance of Enforcing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Action
by the Security Council, 22 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 161 (1973); Corey, U.N. Responses to Govern-
ment Oppression, 3 INT'L ORG. 102 (1968); Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Juris-
diction, 124 RECUEIL DES COURS 417-18 (1968-I).
42. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 32. Article 21(1) of the
Declaration categorically confers these political rights equally upon every citizen of a state
and is recognized in the 1963 Declaration and the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. See supra notes 8 and 14.
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tion, with the likely outcome being political domination and eco-
nomic exploitation of deprived racial groups. These deprived groups
would be reduced to second-class dependent citizens in a techni-
cally independent State. All of these features are characteristic of
racism.
A. International Obligations to Eliminate Racism
The preference of a particular race to the exclusion of all others
in forming the government of Fiji clearly comes within the scope of
"racial discrimination" in Article 1 of the 1965 International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination."
As a party to the Convention, Fiji is under an obligation to con-
demn racial discrimination and to pursue a policy of eliminating
racism; to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination
against any persons or groups; to amend, rescind or nullify any laws
and regulations that create racism; to encourage integrative multi-
racial attitudes in diminishing barriers between races; and to dis-
courage anything which strengthens racial division." Article 5 im-
poses an affirmative duty to provide equal political rights for every-
one, including the right to participate in the government directly or
through representatives elected by regular and secret suffrage. Arti-
cle 7 requires the adoption of immediate and effective measures to
combat prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to pro-
mote understanding, tolerance and friendship among ethnic groups.
Fiji filed a reservation restricting its obligations under Article 5
of the Convention. The reservation relates to laws governing elec-
tions, indigenous land rights and school systems in Fiji.4 5 This res-
ervation, however, cannot insulate Fiji from its obligations under
the Convention. It is a general rule of international law that a State
cannot rely on its own legislation or domestic situation to limit the
scope of its international obligations, and that a State is required to
pass necessary legislation to fulfill its international obligations.""
43. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 8. The Convention was ratified
and came into force on January 4, 1969. See Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, supp. no. 18 (A/35/18), U.N. Annex 1, 133 (1980).
44. Id. at art. 2.
45. The reservation is quoted in McLachlan, The Fiji Constitutional Crisis of May
1987: A Legal Assessment, N.Z.L.J. 181 (June 1987).
46. There is ample judicial authority for such a rule. See Free Zone (Fr. v. Switz.),
1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167 (June 7); the advisory opinion in Exchange of Greek
and Turkish Population (Greece v. Turk.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21);
Finnish Ships Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1484; Alabama Claims Arbitration in
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 656 (1872); see also Declaration of the International
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Accordingly, Fiji cannot claim that its domestic laws relating to
elections, land rights and school systems exonerate it from the in-
ternational obligations imposed by the Convention.
Moreover, the Convention constitutes a coherent and integrated
whole, and its designated purpose is to eliminate all forms of racial
discrimination. The immunity sought by Fiji's reservation cannot be
applied piecemeal to individual provisions, without regard for its
effect on the objective of the Convention. It must be read in rela-
tion to other provisions and obligations, so that the very aim of the
Convention is not frustrated. The reservation, if interpreted to be
separate from the other proscriptions of the Convention, will reduce
the entire Convention into an uncoordinated and self-contradictory
document, leaving hardly any meaning to the expression: "the elim-
ination of all forms of racial discrimination."
The Fijian reservation may be construed to embrace a variety of
laws already enacted that provide special concessions. It may also
be construed as protecting indigenous rights, which need not neces-
sarily be discriminatory. Yet, it remains inconceivable how this res-
ervation can exempt Fiji from its international responsibility under
the Convention.
B. Rights of Underprivileged Groups
Colonel Rabuka, the leader of the coups, claims that special con-
stitutional measures must be adopted to ensure that Fiji is always
ruled by the native Fijians and that the purpose of the revolution is
to restore this "birthright. ' 7 On the contrary, numerous interna-
tional authorities advocate the equality of all citizens of a State
irrespective of their race, color, creed, birth or ethnicity.48 While it
is recognized that the indigenous peoples of colonial and non self-
governing territories have the right to self-determination, 4' and
Law Committee on Rights and Duties of States, [1949] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 288, at art.
13.
47. See supra note 7.
48. For analysis of the growing concern of the world community for indigenous rights,
values, interests and culture, see G. Bennett, Aboriginal Rights in International Law, Occa-
sional Paper No. 37 of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
(1978).
49. See, e.g., Decolonization Declaration, supra note 13; A. RIGO SUREDA, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF U.N. PRACTICE (1973);
Kaur, Self-Determination in International Law, 10 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 500 (1970); Menon,
The Right to Self-Determination: A Historical Appraisal, 53 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARt [R. DR. INT. DR. COMP.] 187 (1975). Self-determination is
discussed in Part III, infra.
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may exercise this right to become independent,50 the right is ful-
filled once independence is gained, and there is no inherent right to
monopolize the government of the newly independent State. In the
Namibia case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that
the establishment and enforcement of "distinctions, exclusions, re-
strictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race,
color, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial
of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes
and principles of the Charter."'" In other words, all citizens of a
State are equally entitled to all rights and subjected to all duties. In
view of this legal position, it is difficult to substantiate the claim
that the native Fijians, by dint of their "indigenousness," possess a
"birthright" to perpetually govern multiracial Fiji.
In fairness, it is conceded that the reservation of governmental
power for the native Fijians may be necessary for the enjoyment of
their indigenous rights. Provisions providing special measures or
privileges for certain groups are common in many constitutions.
These measures are devised to safeguard the rights of disadvan-
taged or underprivileged groups or areas in a State. Such measures
may be of paramount importance to the even development of a
State. However, it must be borne in mind that the sole aim of a
"special measure" is to promote the equal rights of its beneficiaries.
The question is: Do the native Fijians deserve a special measure to
protect their right to participate in the government of Fiji?
The answer to this question is largely a matter of ascertaining
whether the native Fijians have enjoyed equal political rights in the
past. Since its independence in 1970, Fiji has been administered by
the Alliance Government of Kamisese, a predominantly native Fi-
jian government. 2 This government lost power in the April 1987
general election." Until then, the native Fijians were effectively in
50. Different modes of exercising self-determination are enumerated in the Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the U.N., G.A. Res. 2625(xxv), at princi-
ple v, para. 4 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1296 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly
Relations].
51. Namibia (Namibia v. S. Afr.), 1971 I.C.J. 57 (Advisory Opinion of June 21). For
a full treatment of the principles of equality and non-discrimination in international law, see
W. McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
52. For an analysis of the native Fijians predominance through the alliance monopoly
of government since 1966, prior to independence, see Nation, Fiji: Post Independence Polit-
ics in 2 MELANESIA: BEYOND DIVERSITY 602-03 (R.J. May & H. Nelson eds. 1982);
Premdas, Constitutional Challenge: The Rise of Fijian Nationalism, 9 PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE
40-41 (1980).
53. The 1987 general election disrupted the indigenous control of Fiji's political power
structure. Colonel Rabuka, the revolutionary leader, claiming to represent the wishes of the
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control of the government, both directly and indirectly through
their elected representatives, from the birth of Fiji as an indepen-
dent State. This fact confirms that the native Fijians were by no
means disadvantaged in the enjoyment of their political rights.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the native Fijians
are politically underprivileged and their plight warrants special
constitutional protection. The question then becomes: for how long
would this special protection be essential? Special protection
adopted for the advancement of a deprived group of peoples cannot
continue indefinitely. Once a specific objective is attained, the spe-
cial rights must be discontinued. The proposed special constitu-
tional protection guaranteeing the governmental power of Fiji to be
held permanently by the native Fijians would surpass the permissi-
ble limit of "special measures." In fact, the proposed reservation
does not seem to be a special measure designed to ensure the equal
enjoyment of political rights by the native Fijians. Rather, it ap-
pears to maintain separate rights for separate racial groups, and
approaches the parameters of racial discrimination.
The proposed constitutional guarantee cannot be justified as a
special measure to protect the rights of native Fijians. There is no
evidence of past discrimination against the native population, and
there is no limit on the duration of the measure. This guarantee
undermines the U.N. objective to build a world society based on the
principle of the dignity and equality of all human beings, free from
racial discrimination and segregation. The guarantee defies numer-
ous authoritative international instruments protecting human rights
and prohibiting racial discrimination. The current regime adopts an
official policy of racism through legislation, keeping various racial
groups in subordination. The promotion of racial discrimination at
a time when concerted international actions to eradicate racism
have intensified, is likely to generate regional and international
repercussions.
native Fijians, could not accept the resettlement of political power. He deposed the newly-
elected government of Bavadra within a month of its installation. Superficially, one may
argue that the military takeover was not a response to the failure of the new Bavadra govern-
ment in running the country, but an effort to recapture the power lost in the 1987 polls. In
other words, what was not achieved through ballots in April 1987 was eventually achieved by
bullets in May 1987.
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III. THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AND THE
FIJIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
enshrined in the U.N. Charter is comprised of two phases: external
and internal. The external phase refers to the right of a people who
are not yet independent to freely choose their future political status
in the international arena. If they choose independence by estab-
lishing their own State, the people achieve their right to external
self-determination. The people, as nationals of an independent
State, are now entitled to the right to internal self-determination.
This right allows them to elect and maintain a government of their
choice. Internal self-determination also includes the right to be free
from oppression and discrimination by the government or any other
dominant group." In other words, the right to external self-deter-
mination is extinguished when independence is gained, and is re-
placed by the right to internal self-determination.
A. Self-Determination for all Peoples
The promotion of external self-determination of peoples received
its greatest boost at the end of colonialism. Many dependent peo-
ples and territories throughout the world became independent
through the exercise of external self-determination. The U.N. role
in decolonization is part of its endeavor to protect and promote
human rights for all. Once independence is achieved, it is impera-
tive to care for the oppressed and deprived groups of peoples within
the independent States. U.N. member States have assumed the re-
sponsibility "to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."' 55 The realization of this principle is recognized as a pre-
requisite for "the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for" the attainment of the U.N. purposes."
The term "peoples" to which the principle applies is construed to
include all peoples, irrespective of their political status.57 In its re-
54. For a discussion on this point, see Cassese, Political Self-Determination-Old
Concepts and New Developments in U.N. LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 137 (A. Cassese ed.
1979); Mustafa, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law, 5 INT'L LAW.
479 (1971); see also Menon, supra note 49, at 187.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. For a full exposition, see Chen, Self-Determination as a
Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 215 (M. Reisman & B.H.
Weston eds. 1976).
56. Id.
57. See the advisory opinion of the I.C.J. in Namibia (Namibia v. S. Afr.), 1971 I.C.J.
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quest to the Commission on Human Rights to draft an article on
the principle of equal rights and self-determination, the General
Assembly resolved that the text must include that "all peoples shall
have the right to self-determination ' 58 and that "all States" should
promote its realization in their territories. 9 In 1955, the U.N.
Third Committee, unanimously approving the term "all peoples" in
the draft, found the term comprehensive, universal and fully in con-
sonance with the word "peoples" used in the Charter." The 1960
Decolonization Declaration accords the right of self-determination
to "all peoples" without drawing any distinction between dependent
and independent peoples.61 The inclusion of the expression: "all
peoples have the right of self-determination" in the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights denotes the general character
of its beneficiaries. The Covenants impose the duty to ensure the
realization of the right of self-determination on all party States.6"
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations confers equal rights
and self-determination on "all peoples" deprived and discriminated
against in all States and territories. The Declaration specifies that
all States have the duty to respect this right in pursuance of the
U.N. Charter provisions.6"
It is evident that the right to self-determination has a universal
connotation. All peoples, whether they are exploited and discrimi-
nated against by overseas colonial powers or powers within existing
States, are entitled to equal rights and self-determination. It is a
continuing right with two successive phases--external and internal.
Only when both aspects of the right are enjoyed by a people are
their equal rights and self-determination deemed to have material-
ized. Many peoples in independent States are still discriminated
against because of their race, sex, language, religion, color or
ethnicity. It is not only incongruous with the essence of the right,
but also self-defeating if a people, once they attain independence,
are deprived of their equal rights and self-determination in the do-
mestic sphere.
The population of Fiji is comprised of indigenes and settlers. The
57 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
58. G.A. Res. 421 (1950).
59. G.A. Res. 545 (v) (1952).
60. U.N. Doc. A/3077 (1955).
61. See Decolonization Declaration, supra note 13, para. 2.
62. International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, art. 1 (3) (1966), 6 I.L.M. 360, 368 (1967).
63. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 50.
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former are the native peoples inhabiting the territory since time im-
memorial. The latter arrived from adjacent regions, mostly from
India, providing cheap labor in the sugar cane industry. The set-
tlers have resided in Fiji for many generations prior to indepen-
dence. The right of these peoples to live together with the native
Fijians and to consider themselves members of the Fijian commu-
nity could not be ignored at the time of independence. All groups of
peoples present in the territory at the time of independence, regard-
less of their race, ethnicity or place of origin, acquired Fijian na-
tionality by due process of law." All Fijian nationals are equally
entitled to equal rights under law. They are all entitled to a govern-
ment of their own choice and to the right to be free from oppression
and discrimination. With these ends in view, the 1970 Indepen-
dence Constitution of Fiji assured the equality of all nationals in
the enjoyment of all political and constitutional rights.65
The proposed guarantee to entrust the executive authority exclu-
sively to the native population implies that other racial groups
would be permanently deprived of their equal political rights. They
could be discriminated against in every sphere of public activities,
keeping them in perpetual subjugation. The bulk of the population
would be effectively prevented from enjoying their right to internal
self-determination. The proposed guarantee would manifestly run
afoul not only of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"' but
also of human rights provisions and the purpose of the U.N. Char-
ter.67 In advocating this proposal, Fiji contemplates violating the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples protected
by international law.
IV. THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AND
REGIONAL ORDER
The maintenance of international peace and security and the pro-
motion of and respect for human rights are preeminent objectives
of the world community." Real and enduring world order may not
be preserved without respect for human rights. This is why the in-
terdependence between human rights and the sustenance of peace
64. How the settlers gained Fijian nationality is discussed in Premdas, supra note 52,
at 30-32.
65. See Nation, supra note 52, at 606.
66. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, at art. 21.
67. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 13 (Lb), 55(c), 62(2), 68, and 76(c).
68. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1. The four U.N. purposes under Article I can broadly be
reduced to these two.
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and security has long been acknowledged.19 Order and justice are
interrelated." ° Justice cannot be administered unless order prevails
and order cannot be sustained if justice is denied. An effective bal-
ance between them in the forthcoming Republican Constitution of
Fiji is therefore imperative.
A. The Need for National Unity
In a multiracial State like Fiji, various racial groups coexist by
accommodating each other's interests, rights, and values. 1 The pro-
posed constitutional guarantee would interrupt the existing multi-
racial equilibrium in Fiji and endanger political stability. The situa-
tion may incite counter-coups as a means of redressing the persis-
tent deprivation of equal rights. Repeated constitutional crises will
not only inhibit the development of Fiji's national identity, but will
also lead to the collapse of its political fabric and unity.
It is, however, not certain that the nonindigenous racial groups
will employ violence as a means of remedying their grievances.
There is no gain to anyone in encouraging the disintegration of Fiji.
But if greater political unity and territorial integrity is desirable,
then specific constitutional measures are warranted to foster it.
Otherwise, Fiji will be confronted with difficulties in maintaining
peace and unity among its constituent races due to their questiona-
ble loyalty. The Fijian patriotism of all racial groups cannot be ex-
pected to grow in a vacuum of nonparticipation in national govern-
mental affairs. The feeling of common nationality flourishes only
through active participation in national powers and responsibilities.
The proposed constitutional guarantee militates against any at-
tempt to develop a common Fijian nationality. Consequently, there
may be a large-scale deflection of loyalty from the Fijian
government.
Alienation of racial groups is precisely what caused the disinte-
gration of the Federation of Pakistan in 1971. The ruling elite
failed to promote Pakistani nationalism in East Pakistan. The uni-
lateral imposition of an unrepresentative regime in Pakistan, and
69. The view is presented fully in Wiseberg, Humanitarian Intervention Lessons
From The Nigerian Civil War, 7 HUM. RTs. J. 61 (1974); Nanda, A Critique of the U.N.
Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DEN. L.J. 67 (1972); Dugard, Towards the Definition
of International Terrorism, 67 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 97 (1973).
70. For an explanation of what order and justice are in international law and how they
are related, see Bull, Order vs. Justice in International Society, 19 POL. STUD. 269 (1971).
71. A full exposition of this point may be found in M.R. ISLAM, THE BANGLADESH
LIBERATION MOVEMENT: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 271-73 (1987).
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the consistent denial of equal rights and internal self-determination
for the Bengalese contributed significantly to the secession of East
Pakistan as the Republic of Bangladesh.7 If Fijian nationalism ex-
periences a similar crisis, brought to fruition by the persistent de-
nial of internal self-determination, there is a possibility of a separa-
tist claim by the aggrieved racial groups.
B. Territorial Integrity
State unity and integrity are indispensable for the maintenance
of a stable and organized world order. With this end in view, Arti-
cle 2(4) of the U.N. Charter confers on States a right to territorial
integrity. It must be stressed that no legal right is absolute. Each
right is restricted by a corresponding legal duty. A State's right to
territorial integrity under Article 2(4) of the Charter is balanced
by its responsibility to respect the human rights of its citizens under
Article 1(3) of the Charter. The unity and integrity of a State is
therefore based on a foundation of strict respect for human rights.
Accordingly, the right of Fiji to territorial integrity is contingent
upon its duty to respect the human rights of its citizens.
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations73 is described as
"the most authoritative Statement of the principles of international
law relevant to the questions of self-determination and territorial
integrity." '74 The Declaration was created under the direct author-
ity of the U.N. Charter,'7  and codifies the Charter provisions on
the seven selected principles of international law, creating legal
rights and duties.76 The Declaration clearly states that "the princi-
ples of the Charter which are embodied in the Declaration consti-
tute basic principles of international law."'7 7 As such, the Declara-
72. Id. at 288-90.
73. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 50.
74. The Events in East Pakistan, 1971, Geneva: The Secretariat of I. Corn. Jur. 67
(1972). See also Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 714 (1971); Johnson, Toward Self-Deter-
mination: A Reappraisal as Reflected in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 155 (1973).
75. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 13 & 14.
76. International organizations play a useful role in filling in the gaps in existing inter-
national law. See the joint separate opinion of the I.C.J. in Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v.
Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 46 (Judgment of July 25); Schachter, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the
Security Council and General Assembly, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 962 (1964); Sahovic, Codifica-
tion of the Legal Principles of Co-Existence and the Development of Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND COOPERATIONS 9 (M. Sahovic ed. 1972).
77. Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the U.N., 109 RECUEIL
DES COURS 165 (1963-11).
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tion creates concrete legal obligations under the U.N. Charter and
international law.
Principle V of the Declaration deals with equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. Paragraph 7 of this principle spells out
the right of a State to territorial integrity and is divisible into three
interrelated parts. The first part protects the territorial integrity of
a sovereign State: "[N]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States. .". ."" This pro-
tection is not extended to all States. The rest of the provision sin-
gles out which States are entitled to this protection. The second
part provides that only those States that are "conducting them-
selves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-de-
termination of peoples enjoy this protection."7 9 To comply with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the par-
agraph concludes, a State must possess "a government representing
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
race, creed or color." 80
The right of a State to territorial integrity is no longer unquali-
fied. It is tempered by a corresponding duty which requires the
State to provide a representative government to ensure equal rights
and self-determination of all peoples under its territorial control. If
people within a State have a representative government and enjoy
human rights, those people are enjoying their equal rights and self-
determination. Any attempt aimed at total or partial disintegration
of the territorial integrity or political unity of the State is thereby
prevented.
What happens if a State disregards the duties owed to its nation-
als? The Declaration on Friendly Relations provides all peoples in a
plural society with a high degree of internal self-government to de-
velop cultural, social, economic and political institutions. This is the
basic tenet of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples. The enjoyment of equal rights and self-determination is
lacking in unrepresentative regimes controlled by dictators, military
oligarchs or racist groups. So formulated, the Declaration neither
recognizes the titles of these regimes over their peoples nor protects
their territorial integrity. These regimes may not legitimately in-
78. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 50, at principle v, para. 7.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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voke paragraph 7 of Principle V to preserve their territorial integ-
rity and political unity. People within these States, deprived of their
equal rights, may resort to any self-help remedy to reclaim their
rights. The remedy employed may even dismember the territorial
integrity and political unity of the State. Nonetheless, such action
is justified by the regime's failure to comply with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
Principle V of the Declaration on Friendly Relations thus creates
a "check and balance" between the rights of States and of peoples.
People are barred from contravening the political unity and territo-
rial integrity of a State that respects their equal rights and self-
determination. Conversely, a State is vulnerable if it suppresses the
human rights of its nationals under the cloak of territorial integrity.
The Republic of Fiji is entitled to political unity and territorial
integrity only if its government represents the whole population and
provides adequate guarantees of equal rights and self-determination
for all. But under the proposed guarantee of governmental power
for the native, Fiji would not be in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination. As such, Fiji would not be enti-
tled to the insulation of territorial integrity under Principle V. The
unrepresentative character of the proposed Fijian government and
its potential violation of the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination makes the regime illegal. This illegality furnishes a justifi-
cation for counteraction which may end up impairing the political
unity and territorial integrity of Fiji.
Postulating that there would be no political future for nonindige-
nous Fijians, they may attempt secession to safeguard their rights,
interests and values. Implementation of a new delimitation of the
existing boundaries of Fiji would not be simple and orderly. Bitter
and destructive use of force seems to be the usual pattern in every
secessionist attempt. Should such an eventuality occur in Fiji, it
would obviously have a radical impact on the status quo of regional
peace and stability, and would undermine the global order.
C. Regional Order
International law does not generally concern itself with the legal-
ity or illegality of domestic activities within a State. The constitu-
tionality of a regime is not a legal criterion of its international per-
sonality, competence or recognition. A valid domestic act, however,
may infringe on international law. Various acts of the South Afri-
can government, for example, are legitimate under its national
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laws, but are contrary to international law. This is because "State
sovereignty represents no more than the competence, however wide,
which States enjoy within the limits of international law," and
every State is under a duty to bring its national laws and constitu-
tion into harmony with international law. 81 Viewed from this per-
spective, the constitutional status of the post-revolutionary regime
in Fiji may be immaterial under international law. But any internal
policy of the regime inconsistent with international law may be a
matter of legitimate international concern.
International concern may grow even if the interests of other
States are not directly involved or imperiled by the proposed consti-
tutional guarantee in Fiji. The reason for this is that every State is
expected to maintain a minimum standard of human rights for na-
tionals. When States do not maintain this standard, international
jurisdiction becomes operative. In this era of emphasis on human
rights, systematic suppression of human rights in a State produces
deprivatory effects not only on its own peoples, but also upon peo-
ples outside the border who share the same expectations.82 This is
precisely why internal violation of human rights engenders interna-
tional repercussions. The consistent deprivation of equal rights and
internal self-determination of non-native Fijians may be a factor
contributing to instability in the South Pacific.
CONCLUSION
The proposed constitutional guarantee in Fiji will breach two
principal objectives of the U.N.-the promotion and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. As such, the overall situ-
ation will come well within the competence and jurisdiction of the
world community and its forum-the U.N. The nature and content
of the forthcoming Republican Constitution of Fiji may be an influ-
ential factor in the decisions of many members of the world com-
munity to either recognize or oppose the post revolutionary develop-
ments in Fiji.
The political unity of Fiji depends upon the success of racial inte-
81. J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (7th ed. 1972).
82. In its advisory opinion in the Namibia case, the I.C.J. held that the condition of
human rights within a state and the quality of international public order are interrelated.
Namibia (Namibia v. S. Afr.), 1971 I.C.J. 57, 72 (Advisory Opinion of June 21). Human
rights cannot be consistently denied in a country without international consequences. See the
Secretary General's statement in 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 18, 1977, at 34.
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gration in yielding a common Fijian national identity. Political
unity will endure if national identity strengthens. To accomplish
this, the identity, values, interests, and rights of all racial groups
must be recognized in a constitution that creates a comprehensive
identification with Fiji. All racial groups must have reasonable ex-
pectations that it will be more advantageous for them to remain
within the existing Republic of Fiji. To this end, internal self-deter-
mination in the form of equal rights for the constituent racial
groups is a viable and stable means of ensuring the political unity
of multiracial Fiji.
This is not to assert that the native Fijians are not entitled to any
constitutional protection for their indigenous rights. Indeed, there is
growing concern for indigenous rights, interests, values and culture
at the international level. This trend represents an advance in fun-
damental human rights of indigenous peoples throughout the world.
Indigenous rights in Fiji may be protected effectively through posi-
tive and constructive means. One possible course is to enact a range
of legislation protecting indigenous rights. Alternatively, various
statutes under the 1970 Constitution, dealing with major rights of
the native, may be amended to safeguard indigenous rights in more
concrete terms. It is not necessary that the legislation be discrimi-
natory and prejudicial.
All racial groups must have a right to participate in the govern-
mental power structure of Fiji. Through this process all racial
groups will become wholehearted citizens, showing their unqualified
loyalty and allegiance to the Republic of Fiji. This arrangement
will not only maximize the political unity and territorial integrity of
Fiji, but will also minimize the disruption to the regional and world
order. In performing these tasks, the Republic of Fiji is under a
duty to bring all laws and the constitution in conformity with inter-
national law.
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